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LEGISLATION
STATUTORY PROTECTION OF THE STOCKBROKER'S CUSTOMER FROM UNAUTE1ORIZED SALES AND PLEDGES or His SECURITIES-A broker, if he has posses-

sion or control of his customer's bonds or shares of stock, properly indorsed to
transfer title, has the power so to dispose of these securities as to give the transferee the right to withhold them from the customer, either permanently, should
the transfer be a sale, or until payment of the indebtedness secured by them, should
it be a pledge.' Lack of authority to transfer the stock does not defeat the claim
of a purchaser or2 pledgee for value without notice of any defect in the broker's
right of disposal.
It appears to be impracticable for the customer to protect himself against the
exercise by an unscrupulous broker of this power over his stocks and bonds.
The system of buying and selling securities through brokers dealing with one
another as principals, on the behalf of undisclosed customers, involves even in a
cash transaction the passage of the stock, indorsed to transfer title, through the
hands of both the vendor's and the vendee's broker on its way to the purchaser.
And in margin transactions the broker, for his own protection, in order to render
effective the lien which he has on all securities purchased by him on margin for
the customer or deposited with him as margin, 3 will demand that he be given an
assignment in blank of the securities held by him. 4 Without this, he would be
unable to borrow, upon a re-pledge of his customer's securities as collateral, the
money necessary to carry the transaction, or to sell the securities in satisfaction
of his lien should the customer fail to repay his advances. 5
The customer's chief common law remedy for a misappropriation of his
securities is an action for conversion against the broker. Every unauthorized
sale or pledge of another's property is a conversion at common law.8 It is a
conversion for a broker having a lien on a particular security to hypothecate it for
IMcNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bank, 46 N. Y. 325 (i87I) ; Shattuck v. American Cement Co.,
205 Pa. 197, 54 At. 78.5 (19o3). This rule is incorporated in the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act, § 7, 6 UNIFORM LAws, ANNOTATED (1922) 12.
2
Furber v. Dane, 203 Mass. io8, 89 N. E. 277 (19o9) ; Matter of Mills, 125 App. Div.
730, 11o N. Y. Supp. 314, aff'd 193 N. Y. 626, 86 N. E. 1126 (igo8).

'The customer becomes owner of the stock from the moment of its purchase by the
broker, Sproul v. Sloan, 241 Pa. 284, 88 At. 501 (913), even though the latter has advanced
all the purchase money, Lamprecht v. State, 84 Ohio St. 32, 95 N. E. 656 (1911). But the
broker has a lien on the stock purchased and becomes a pledgee thereof to the extent of the
advances made by him in executing the customer's order, Sterling's Estate, 254 Pa. 155, 98
Atl. 771 (i9i6).
' The broker has a right to take title in his own name to stock purchased on margin for
a customer, Hortan v. Morgan, i9 N. Y. 170 (1859) ; Shiel v. Stoneham, 77 Misc. 125, 135
N. Y. Supp. 1024 (1911).
'As an implied term of the contract between customer and broker, the latter has a right
to re-pledge, up to the amount of his advances, all securities of the former on which he has
a lien, whether purchased by the broker on margin, or deposited by the customer as collateral,
Douglas v. Carpenter, 17 App. Div. 329, 45 N. Y, Supp. 219 (1897); Turner v. Schwartz,
140 Md. 465, 117 Att. 904 (1922) ; Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 198, 26 At. 874 (1893).
Contra: Westinghouse v. German Nat. Bank, 188 Pa. 630, 41 Atl. 734 (1898) (as to securities deposited by the customer to secure his margins). The broker's right, in the absence of
an agreement to the contrary, to re-pledge securities bought on murgin for a customer is,
however, expressly recognized by statute in Pennsylvania, Act of June io, I881, P. L. io7,
§ i, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 8030.
But the broker has no lien on and no implied authority to pledge stock for which the customer has fully paid, In re J. C. Wilson & Co., 252 Fed. 631 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1917), or
left with him for sale or safekeeping only, Austin v. Hayden, 171 Mich. 38, 137 N. W. 317
(1912).
8

Kittredge v. Grannis, 244 N. Y. 168, 155 N. E. 88 (1926).
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a larger sum than he has advanced thereon to the owner,7 or to hypothecate a
security deposited as collateral before he has made any advances I or after his
advances have been repaid.' If the broker has authority to sell for a specific
purpose, it is a conversion for him to sell for another,' 0 or to pledge instead of
selling." "The result of the authorities is that if the agent parts with the property, in a way or for a purpose not authorized, he is liable for a conversion. But
if he parts with it in accordance with his authority, though at a less price, or if he
misapplies the avails, or takes inadequate for sufficient security, he is not liable
for the conversion of the poperty." 12
Yet in actual practice the broker's liability in damages is not a very effectual
deterrent to unauthorized appropriations of his cusomers' securities because of
the ease with which a broker may conceal an unauthorized sale or pledge. A
broker is under no obligation to return to the owner the specific securities deposited with him, 3 but fulfils his legal duties towards his customer by always having
available for delivery, on tender and demand by the customer, securities of like
kind with those pledged in sufficient amount (including those properly re-hypothecated) to satisfy all customers." A consequence of this rule is that if the broker
is able to deliver upon demand, an intervening technical conversion will ordinarily
pass undiscovered, thus enabling the broker to successfully conceal his misappropriations by using one customer's bonds to pay off another as long as he continues
apparently solvent.' 5 Statutory abrogation of the rule in its entirety, however,
would hamper the legitimate conduct of credit transactions because free interchangeability of securities is essential to the pledges en bloc of stocks, through
which brokers procure the cash necessary to carry their customers' margin
accounts. 6
There remains, as a preventative for unauthorized transfers by a broker, the
sanction of criminal penalties. But the technicalities of common law larceny have
excluded from the scope of that offense most misappropriations of securities by
brokers. Under the established doctrine it is impossible for a stockbroker to be
convicted of larceny unless there be proof that he fraudulently induced the owner
to deliver to him the property converted.' 7 For a broker, in his capacity as agent,
has possession, not custody, of the securities he holds for another's interest, 8
and accordingly he cannot be guilty of a trespass except at the moment he obtains
possession of them, nor guilty of a trespass against the owner unless he secures
possession from him by force or fraud. 19 Furthermore larceny requires an
intent, existing at the time of the trespass, to permanently deprive the owner of
his property. There has been considerable doubt whether the existence of this
intent should be inferred from an unauthorized pledge. 0 The rule would seem
'Wood v. Fisk, 215 N. Y. 233,

1O9 N. E. i77 (I9I.5).
'In re Tracy, 191 Fed. 81o (C. C. A. 2d, 1911).
'Van Voorhis v. Rea, 153 Pa. 19, 25 Atl. 8oo (893).
"Kittredge v. Grannis, supra note 6.
See Parsons v. Martin, II Gray III (Mass. 1858).
'Laverty v. Sneathen, 68 N. Y. 522, 527 (1877).
"Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U. S. 365, 28 Sup. Ct. 512 (I9O8).
" Turner v. Schwartz, supra note 5; Commonwealth v. Nixon, 94 Pa. Super. 333 (1928).
People v. Atwater, 229 N. Y. 303, 128 N. E. 196 (i92o). For a discussion of the
difficulties involved in determining the priorities of various customers in bankruptcy, and the
consequent trouble which they incur in recovering their property or an indemnity therefor,
see Oppenheimer, Rights and Obligations of Customers in Stockbrokerage Bankruptcies
(1924) 37 HARv. L. REV. 86o.
"CAMPBELL, STOCKBROKnMS (2d ed. 1922) 46.
' People v. Meadows, 199 N. Y. I, 92 N. E. 128 (1910) ; CLARK, CRIMINAL LAW (3d ed.
1915) 320 et seq.

"Commonwealth v. Althouse,

LAw (9th ed. 1923) 628, 633.
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Mass. 32, 93 N. E. 2o2

(I91o) ; 2

BIsHoP,

CRIMINAL

Commonwealth v. Althouse, supra note 18; 2 BIsHoP, op. cit. supra note 18, at 6,5,
"Regina v. Phaetheon, 9 Car. & P. 552 (Eng. 184o).

622.
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to be that a pledge does not necessarily show an intent to permanently deprive the
owner of his property, since the pledgor retains the right to recover the pledge, 21
but that the jury may be justified in inferring from the attendant circumstances
22
that the accused did not intend to exercise this right and restore the property.
In connection with a similar question the New York Court of Appeals has said:
"A re-pledge, unlike a sale, does not involve an absolute repudiation of
the title of the primary pledgor. .

.

rather than absolute and malicious.2 3

. The conversion is partial and technical

Yet the 24pledgee's limited property will become absolute if the pledgor does not
redeem.

Embezzlement statutes have dispensed with the necessity of a trespass, 25 but
they raise new difficulties by reason of their being construed to require a fiduciary
relationship between the accused and the owner of the property embezzled,
whether referring to "any persons" or to specific classes of agents and fiduciaries. 2' The broker who has a lien on securities in his possession is an agent in
respect to his obligation to deal with the securities as directed by his customer, a
creditor in respect to the customer's indebtedness to him for his advances, and a
pledgee in respect to his right to retain the securities as collateral for that indebtedness. 27 This tri-partite relationship led to a decision that where the statute
required the property to have been received by the accused "by virtue of his employment as agent", a broker could not be convicted of embezzling property
delivered to him as collateral security for a customer's margins because such
property was not delivered by virtue of his employment, but by virtue of his
position as creditor.28 A broker obligated to redeliver the securities pledged with
him as collateral may be convicted, however, of the crime of embezzlement by a
bailee.20 On the other hand it has been held that a broker holding securities for
sale or exchange cannot be convicted of embezzling them as bailee, although he
may be convicted of embezzling their proceeds if he sells them with intent to
defraud. This decision was placed in one case on the ground that as the parties
did not contemplate the return of the securities to the customer, or the return of
securities of like kind, there could be no bailment. 0 In another it was placed on
the ground that the broker, being authorized to sell, could not convert the property
by selling it for his own benefit. 31 Both decisions raise the contested question
whether a general authority to sell is in reality a specific authority to sell for the
principal's benefit. If it is, then the sale is a conversion and the relationship is
that of bailment since the securities would then have been delivered as property
of the customer deposited for a special purpose only. Accordingly in other cases
'Regina v. Wright, 9 Car. & P. 554 n. (Eng. 1828).
'Truslow v. State, 9.5 Tenn. i8g, 31 S. W. 987 (1895). There should be evidence of
both the ability and the expectation to redeem, Regina v. Medland, 5 Cox Cr. Cas. 292 (Eng.
1851) ; Regina v. Tribilcock, 7 Cox Cr. Cas. 408 (Eng. 1858).
' Wood v. Fisk, supra note 7, at 239, 24r, IO9 N. E. at 178, 179.
22 BisHop, op. cit. supra note i8, at 641.
People v. Meadows, supra note 17; Commonwealth v. Nixon, supra note 14, where the

broker was convicted of embezzling a customer's securities though the stock certificate had
never come into the possession of either.
' CLARi, op. cit. supra note 17, at 357; 2 BisHop, oP. cit. supra note i8, at 294.
' Austin v. Hayden, supra note 5; Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235 (i869).
'Buddeke v. State, 12 Ohio C. C. (N. s.) 454 (igio), aff'd 83 Ohio St. 451, 94 N. E.
x116 (i9io).
I People v. Tambara, 192 Cal. 236, 219 Pac. 745 (1923). In State v. Peck, 299 Mo. 454,
253 S. W. 1019 (1923), the court doubted whether a broker holding securities as pledgee
could be convicted of embezzling them as bailee.
"People v. Wildeman, 325 Ill. 99, 156 N. E. 257 (i927).
State v. Peck, supra note 29.
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authority to sell has
not prevented the broker from being convicted of embezzling
3 2
the securities sold.

Assuming the necessary relationship of trust to be shown any act amounting
to a conversion suffices to bring the broker within the statute."3 Many embezzlement laws in terms define the crime as being the "fraudulent conversion" of
property.34 Not only is an unauthorized hypothecation embezzlement,3 5 but a
hypothecation in an authorized manner, as by pledging a bond apart from the
note secured by it, may also be embezzlement. 6 A taking from the owner's
possession is unnecessary.3 7
Yet in no event is the broker guilty of embezzlement, however unauthorized
his act, unless he has an intent to defraud the owner of his property at the moment
of conversion."' This element of intent was early read into embezzlement statutes
not expressly requiring it by analogy to the wrongful intent in larceny, 39 and has
carried with it the same haziness respecting the intent to be inferred from an
unauthorized hypothecation.4 °
In some jurisdictions an attempt has been made to prescribe a more definite
or a more stringent standard for the stockbroker than that afforded by the ordinary criminal law. This attempt is evidenced by statutes providing that an agent
or broker who appropriates money or property entrusted to him in a manner contrary to his written instructions is guilty of a distinct crime. 41 Where the
violated instructions are written there is less danger that the broker has misunderstood the real nature of his authority, and consequently more ground for rigorous
punishment. These statutes also in general define the criminal act as being any
disposition of the property for a purpose, or in a way contrary to the customer's
written directions,4 2 terms susceptible of broader application than has been given
to common law conversion. They require, however, that the misappropriation be
"in violation of good faith", 3 or made "purposely and intentionally", 4 or be
'People v. Stafford, 81 Cal. App. 159, 253 Pac. 183 (927).
And see Mearns v. Chatard, 47 App. D. C. 257 (1918) ; Kittredge v. Grannis, supra note 6; Landrum v. State, 73
Tex. Crim. Rep. 58o, I66 S. W. 726 (1914).
'Brown v. State, 3 Ohio App. 52 (1914) ; State v. Alexander, 140 S. C. 325, 138 S. E.
835 (1927) ; 2 Bisuop, op. cit. supra note 18, at 311.
"ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1929) c. 38, §§ 39, 188; PA. STAT. (West, 1920) §§ 7816, 7830.
'Commonwealth v. Butterick, IOO Mass. I (1868); Hayes v. State, 24 Ohio C. C.
(N. s.) 497 (igio), aff'd 83 Ohio St. 490, 94 N. E. 11o7 (I91O).
People v. Tambara, supra note 29.

If property in the security has been transferred to the broker he cannot be convicted
of either larceny or embezzlement even though he fraudulently procured the transfer, see
Landrum v. State, supra note 32, at 581, 166 S. W. at 727; CLARK, op. cit. supra note 17, at
332.

A misappropriation of the security is then only a breach of contract, not a conversion,

Sackville v. Winer, 76 Colo. 519, 233 Pac. 1527

(1925).

Since in Massachusetts, contrary to the general rule, a broker is considered owner of
securities purchased by him on margin for a customer, Wood v. Hayes, 15 Gray 375 (Mass.
186o) ; Chase v. Boston, i8o Mass. 458, 62 N. E. io.s8 (I9O2), the broker cannot be guilty in
that state of stealing securities purchased on a customer's order if still unpaid for by the
latter.
'State v. Parker, 112 Conp. 39, 151 Atl. 325 (930) ; Brown v. State, supra note 33.
"State v. Parker, supra note 38; State v. Eastman, 6o Kan. 557, 57 Pac. 1O9 (1899).
'See State v. Larson, 123 Wash. 21, 211 Pac. 885 (1923), where it was held that an
intent to defraud was to be inferred from the defendant's act in putting the property beyond
his control. Once it is established that the property was sold or pledged with fraudulent
intent an expectation of ultimately making restitution is no defense, People v. Schrager, 315
Ill. 169, 146 N. E. 151 (1924).
" "This is not a statute to punish embezzlement, but to protect persons who place in
charge of another funds for control and investment, accompanied by specific instructions."
People v. Karste, 132 Mich. 455, 4.59, 93 N. W. io8i, IO82 (i9o3).
"MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) Art. 27, §§ 165, x66; 3 MICH. ComP. LAWS (1929)
§ 16913.
IMD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) Art. 27, §§ 165, 166.
"3 MicH. ComP. LAws (1929) § 16913.
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performed by embezzling or fraudulently converting the property, 45 thereby perpetuating the requisite of a fraudulent intent. Similar efforts toward the same
end may be seen in statutes expressly forbidding any person holding as security
for a debt stocks, or other property the title to which passes by delivery or
endorsement, to repledge or re-hypothecate such security during the continuance
of the contract of pledge or hypothecation without the consent of the owner.46
It has been held that such a statute does not apply to stock held by a broker as
security for his customer's margins because authority to repledge such stock is
presumed from the custom of brokers. 7 The principles of the foregoing statutory types sometimes appear in various composite forms as in a Maryland statute
providing that any broker or agent entrusted with money or a security for the
payment of money, with written instructions how to apply such property, is guilty
of a misdemeanor in converting it to his own use contrary to the specified purpose; but that a broker or agent entrusted with a chattel, valuable security, or
power of attorney to transfer stock, without authority to sell or pledge, is guilty
of a separate misdemeanor in disposing of such property contrary to his instructions.4 s The offense created by the foregoing statutes is usually of the grade of
a misdemeanor. Judging from the decided cases none of these enactments appears
to have accomplished a great deal in curbing misappropriations by stockbrokers.
But they do show that many legislative bodies have realized
the risk borne by the
4
customer through the broker's power over his securities.
In 1913, this realization evolved into a new type of statute, referred to in
New York, the state of its origin, as the "Stilwell Act",5 9 and now adopted in
three other states."' This statute first departed from the model of earlier enactments by carefully defining two separate offences capable of being committed only
by stockbrokers: (i) selling or pledging a customer's securities in the broker's
possession, the broker having no lien thereon, without the customer's consent; (2)
selling or pledging a customer's securities in the broker's possession, the broker
having a lien thereon, without the customer's consent, and in the case of a pledge
=2 MASS. GEN. LAWS (92)
c. 256, § 56.
*' MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) Art. 27, § 21r; 2 MASS. GEN. LAws (1921)
PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 8030.

c. 256,

§ 85;

' Furber v. Dane, supra note 2.
4S MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) Art. 27, §§ i65, 166.
A similar provision was formerly
in force in England, by The Larceny Act, 1861, 24 & 25 VIcr. c. 96, § 75, repealed by 6 & 7
GEo. V c. 50, §48 (1916).

', For a discussion of the extent of this power and the need of legislative correction see
Smith, Margin Stocks (192) 35 HARV. L. REV. 485.
' "A person engaged in the business of purchasing and selling as a broker stocks, bonds
or other evidences of debt of corporations, companies or associations, who
"(1) Having in his possession, for safe keeping or otherwise, stocks, bonds or other
evidences of debt of a corporation, company or association belonging to a customer, without
having any lien thereon or any special property therein, pledges or disposes thereof without
such customer's consent; or
"(2) Having in his possession stocks, bonds or other evidences of debt of a corporation,
company or association belonging to a customer on which he has a lien for indebtedness due
to him by the customer, pledges the same for more than the amount due to him thereon, or
otherwise disposes thereof for his own benefit, without the customer's consent, and without
having in his possession or subject to his control, stocks, bonds or other evidences of debt of
the kind and amount to which the customer is then entitled, for delivery to him upon his
demand therefor and tender of the amount due thereon, and thereby' causes the customer to
lose, in whole or in part, such stocks; bonds or other evidences of debt, or the value thereof,
"Is guilty of a felony, punishable by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars or by
imprisonment for not more than two years, or by both.
"Every member of a firm of brokers, who either does, or consents or assents to the doing
of any act which by the provisions of this . . . section is made a felony, shall be guilty
thereof." N. Y. Laws 1913, c. 5oo, N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 193o) c. 41, PENAL LAW

§ 956.

' Ky. Laws 1928, c. 14 (section relating to non-lienholder brokers alone enacted):
MiCH. Comp. LAws (1929) § 98oo; OHIO ANN. CODE (Throckmorton, 1930) § 13108-2.
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for more than the customer's indebtedness to the broker. This novel distinction
between unauthorized acts by brokers without liens and unauthorized acts by
brokers with liens was further emphasized by two important limitations, expressly
imposed by the legislature on the scope of the latter offence, and therefore leading
to the inference that the former was intended not to be thus restricted.
The first of these restrictive clauses, in providing that no offense is committed
if the broker, when disposing of his customer's securities, keeps on hand sufficient
securities of the kind and amount to which the customer is entitled, simply
expresses the common law rule that the broker is not obligated to deliver to the
customer the specific securities entrusted to him.52 Or, as more precisely put in
the Ohio statute, the broker satisfies both his common law and statutory obligations by "having in his possession or subject to his control" securities "of the same
kind and amount available for free delivery and sufficient to satisfy all customers
entitled thereto upon demand thereof and tender of the amount due thereon." r,
The basis of this rule is that the stock certificate or bond is not property itself,
but only evidence of an undivided interest in the assets or obligation of the corporation, which interest remains the same whether evidenced by one certificate or
another.5 The omission of the clause expressing this rule from the first section
of the "Stilwell Act", if it be correctly regarded as abrogating the rule, will oblige
a broker holding securities for safekeeping or sale without a lien thereon to keep
these certificates separate from his general stock of like securities in order to avoid
improperly parting with their possession. While apparently the act imposes a
useless impediment in demanding that the broker refrain from substituting one
share of stock for its equivalent share, yet this requirement has the practical
advantage of making it more difficult for a broker to conceal his misappropriations
by juggling securities from one customer's account to another's. And legitimate
transactions are not hampered inasmuch as the act expressly declares the common
law to govern those transactions where the broker has a right to use his customer's
securities for securing his own loans.
Even more striking is the other limitation in the clause relating to hypothecations by lienholder brokers expressed by the words, "and thereby causes the
customer to lose, in whole or in part, such stocks, bonds or other evidences of
debt, or the value thereof." Although no decision construing this clause has
apparently been rendered, it literally imports that if a broker pledges his customer's securities for a greater amount than the latter's indebtedness, or wilfully
converts them for his own purposes, he is nevertheless not guilty of a violation of
the Act should the customer, who has borne the risk of the broker's speculation,
ultimately recover his stock without loss. But if through misfortune the broker
fails and a fall in the market prevents the owner's redeeming his shares with the
money due the broker thereon, then the broker is a felon. 5 This is a novel
experiment in criminal jurisprudence to make injury instead of intent the decisive
element of a crime."' It may possibly be an attempt to mitigate the severe punishments, never passing below the grade of felony and reaching maximum penalties of from two to ten years' imprisonment, prescribed by these statutes, but, if
so, it goes to the opposite extreme of exonerating altogether even a wilful
wrongdoer.
The first doubt definitely resolved by the courts in interpreting the "Stilwell
Act" arose from the use of the words "having possession" in the text of the
. Turner v. Schwartz, supra note 5; Commonwealth v. Nixon, supra note 14.
SOmo AzTNN.
CoDE (Throckmorton, 1930) § 13108-2.
JONFS, COLLATERAL SECURITIES (3d ed. 1912) §§ 508-511.
For an example see People v. Atwater, supra note 1.5, a case where the defendant's

failure was due to thefts by his partners.

' CAmPBELL, op cit. supra note 16, at 52.
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statute. In People v. Atwater 57 a broker had purchased Libertyj Bonds for a
customer through a correspondent broker giving the latter a promissory note for
the purchase price and leaving the bonds with him as security for the note. The
customer thereafter paid the broker in full for the bonds. Upon maturity of the
note the broker, instead of taking up the bonds, renewed the note, and for this
act he was convicted of unlawful hypothecation of a customer's securities. The
Appellate Division reversed this conviction on the ground that the words "having
possession" must be taken in their literal meaning and that a broker could not be
convicted, therefore, under the statute unless he had actual physical possession or
a present right to possession of the securities at the moment he hypothecated them.
This decision was in turn reversed by the Court of Appeals and the broker's
conviction reinstated on the theory that since at the time of renewing his loan he
might have obtained, through a tender of the amount due on the note, the right
to possession of the securities he had at that moment "constructive possession"
of them. After considering the purpose of the statute the court concluded that
the legislature intended to penalize all unauthorized pledges by brokers regardless
of the precise form of the transaction, and that consequently the judges would be8
justified in giving to the word "possession" the broadest of its many meanings.
The New York courts have also liberally construed the clause providing that
any member of a brokerage firm "who either does or consents or assents to the
doing of any act" forbidden by the statute is guilty of the felony therein created.
Yet it is not enough for conviction that the assent be given after the act has been
performed; there must be at least passive acquiescence while the act is being done
by one's associate.59 On the other hand knowledge that one's partner or employee
is engaged in a wrongful act is unnecessary where the accused has himself established or tolerated a practice in his office the "inevitable consequence" of which
is to lead to unauthorized hypothecations, as, for instance, instructing his clerk
that he may pledge any securities endorsed by a member of the firm as guarantor
unless specific instructions are attached thereto. 0 It would seem from this that
the "Stilwell Act" reaches negligent as well as intentional conversions by a broker
if accompanied by the requisite criminal intent.
That enactment contains no express requirement of a criminal intent. In
construing it the implication of an intent to defraud, made in the case of embezzlement statutes, has been rejected in favor of an interpretation which requires
an evil mind on the part of the broker, but which holds that this evil mind is
present when a broker knowingly pledges or sells a customer's securities in an
unauthorized manner."' The New York courts came to this decision because, in
their estimation, the evil sought to be reached by the legislature was the risk of
losing his property placed upon a customer by the broker's unauthorized act in
giving another dominion over it. Therefore an interpretation was to be excluded
which would make the broker's guilt depend upon an actual fraudulent intent.
Such a construction would not have afforded the customer any greater security
than that given by the embezzlement acts. However, to have dispensed with the
necessity of a criminal mind altogether would have worked great hardship in
making a broker guilty as a felon for an unauthorized pledge where by mistake
he had pledged another's securities instead of his own. The severe penalties
imposed by the act seemed some indication that the legislature considered the

I People v. Atwater, 191 App. Div. 345, 181 N. Y. Supp. 742 (1920), s. c. 229 N. Y. 303,
N. E. 196 (192o).
I That actual possession would have been necessary in embezzlement see Lamprecht v.
State, supra note 3.
People v. Lowe, 2o9 App. Div. 498, 205 N. Y. Supp. 77 (1924).
People v. Sugarman, 216 App. Div. 209, 215 N. Y. Supp. 56 (1926), affd 243 N. Y.
638, z54 N. E. 637 (1926).
I People v. Atwater, supra note 57.
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crime as involving conscious wrongdoing on the broker's part. Accordingly
resort was had to the intermediate interpretation which requires knowledge by
the broker that he is pledging another's security, thereby admitting the defence
of mistake of fact, but which does not require an intent by him to deprive the
customer of his property, thus excluding the defence of an expectation to restore
the security pledged. 62
This alteration in the requisite of intent, together with the definite extension
of the criminal act to include all unauthorized hypothecations and sales, and the
apparent abrogation of the rule permitting the non-lienholder broker to substitute
one share of stock for another, makes the "Stilwel Act" the most adequate protection yet devised for the customer.6 3 Furthermore this is accomplished without
diminishing the rights of an innocent purchaser or pledgee for value. 64 But the
statute in one important respect subjects an honest stockbroker to serious danger.
It is in many jurisdictions an undecided question whether a broker converts
securities held in pledge by re-hypothecating them, along with other securities,
for an amount greater in the aggregate than the customer's indebtedness to the
broker, but yet small enough for the pro rata share of the loan borne by the customer's securities to be within the authorized limit. Conflicting opinions have
been rendered on this subject in New York. 65 In several other states such a
pledge has been held illegal for the reason that the customer cannot recover his
securities from this general pledge by tendering to the sub-pledgee the amount of
his indebtedness to the broker. 6 Other decisions in reaching an opposite conclusion rely on custom and convenience, and consider that there is no conversion
in such a case-as the owner is not deprived of his general property in the securities by the mere act of pledging-until there is a refusal to deliver upon tender
and demand by the customer.6 7 Because of the prevalence of the general pledge
"Undoubtedly a criminal intent is necessary to constitute the crime of which the defendant was convicted; but the criminality of the intent consists of the intent to do the prohibited act with knowledge of all the facts constituting the crime-in this case that the bonds
were the property of the customers, in the possession of the defendant for safe keeping or
otherwise, and that the defendant had no lien thereon. . . . The intent to defraud which
is an element of the crime of larceny, is not a constituent of the crime of hypothecation of
customer's securities; it is an intent to knowingly do the wrongful act prohibited by the
statute." People v. Atwater,,supra note 57, at 350, 181 N. Y. Supp. at 746 (this point approved by the Court of Appeals).
'The "Stilwell Act" also affords the customer certain incidental protection through its
effect on his civil rights. Formerly an unauthorized hypothecation was held not to be within
the meaning of a clause in the Bankruptcy Act excepting liabilities for "wilful and malicious
injuries to the property of another" from the operation of a discharge, Wood v. Fisk, supra
note 7; but since the adoption of the former Act a liability for an unauthorized hypothecation
has been held within this exception on the ground that the words "wilful and malicious" were
to be treated as synonymous with "criminal", Heaphy v. Kerr, i9o App. Div. 8io, I8o N. Y.
Supp. 542 (1920), aff'd 232 N. Y. 526, 134 N. E. 557 (1921). So also the owners of stocks
unlawfully pledged have priority in the proceeds of a pledge en bloc over the owners of
stocks lawfully pledged .therein, Blackenhorn-Hunter-Dulin Co. v. Thayer, i9g Cal. go, 247
Pac. io88 (1926), and in so far as the first section of the Act seems to make a pledge of the
specific stocks delivered, even though like stocks are retained, illegal, the owner of such
stock should receive a priority he formerly did not enjoy.
" That a sale or pledge is a crime on the part of the broker does not limit the transferee's right to retain the securities transfered as against an owner who has entrusted them
to the broker, Fisher v. Clark, 3 F. (2d) 621 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1924) (transfer in violation
of "Stilwell Act") ; Draper v. Saxton, 118 Mass. 427 (0875) (transfer in violation of act
forbidding re-pledge of collateral securities).
Cf. Douglas v. Carpenter, supra note 5, and Strickland v. Magoun, ii9 App. Div. 113,
IO4 N. Y. Supp. 42.9 (iqo7) (both holding a general pledge illegal), with Mayer v. Monzo,
ISI App. Div. 866, 137 N. Y. Supp. 616 (i912) (declaring a general pledge not ipso facto a
conversion).
I Turner v. Schwartz, supra note 5; Commonwealth v. Althouse, supra note x8; Sproul
v. Sloan, supra note 3; Wahl v. Tracy, 139 Wis. 668, I2 N. W. 66o (igog).
I In re Swift, io5 Fed. 493 (D. C. Mass. igoo) ; Clark v. Baillie, 45 Can. S. C. 5o (I9I).
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in stockbrokerage practice Isit is desirable that a statute imposing such severe
penalties as the "Stilwell Act", and also dispensing with the necessity of a fraudulent intent should specifically inform the broker as to the legality of a pledge en
bloc of his customer's securities. 9
H. J.S.
' While a broker can guard himself from prosecution by obtaining express authority
from his customers to pledge their securities in general loans, it would seem that the notices
commonly inserted on the memoranda furnished customers after a sale or purchase for their
account are not in themselves sufficient to grant such authority without positive evidence of
their being assented to by the customer, Turner v. Schwartz, supra note 5; Guthrie & Tenney, Some Legal Problems Connected with Stock Market Transactions (1930) 29 MIcrH. L.
REV. 41.
' A

clause legalizing the general pledge was inserted in the Michigan statute in 1925,
Mich. Public Acts 1925, No. 204, § 2, but removed in 1929, Mich. Public Acts 1929, No.
220, § 32.

